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PUBLIC CORPORATIONS
Huger Sinkler
Theodore B. Guerard*
I. LEGISLATION
At the 1965 session the general assembly enacted several pieces
of legislation which broadened the ability of municipal corpora-
tions and special purpose districts to finance sewage facilities.
In recent years the population growth in various sections
throughout the state of South Carolina both within and without
the city limits has brought about the need for the construction
and extension of sewage collection, treatment and disposal facili-
ties and the 1965 legislation enacted in this field should enable
incorporated cities, towns and special purpose districts to better
deal with this problem.
Two substantially identical acts were passed authorizing the
imposition of front foot assessments to defray the cost of con-
structing sewage collection laterals. Act No. 3491 authorizes
incorporated municipalities, and Act No. 3972 authorizes special
purpose districts to do so. These acts also give the respective
political entities involved other powers to enable them to better
meet the needs for enlarged sewage facilities. Both acts face
test suits in court as far as the authorization to impose front
foot assessments is concerned. The use of the front foot assess-
ment enables the public body involved to tailor the financing of
needed sewage facilities by combining ad valorem taxes, sewer
charges and front foot assessments in order to arrive at the most
equitable financing plan under any given set of circumstances.
By Act No. 3863 enacted at the 1965 session, municipalities
and special purpose districts are authorized to enter into con-
tracts providing for a joint enterprise in the construction of sew-
age collection, treatment and disposal facilities which will serve
the residents of the area served by all of the contracting entities.
The authorizations contained in this act are designed to reduce
duplication of facilities whenever possible.
* Sinkler, Gibbs & Simons, Charleston, South Carolina.
1. S.C. AcTs & J. RES. 1965, p. 614.
2. S.C. AcTs & J. RES. 1965, p. 718.
3. S.C. AcTs & J. REs. 1965, p. 693.
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A. Municipalities Authorized to Impose Front Foot Assessments
for Sewer Lines
Act No. 349 of 1965-Heretofore municipalities have defrayed
the cost of constructing and extending sewage collection, treat-
ment and disposal facilities from the proceeds derived from sewer
or water charges and/or from an ad valorem tax levy. In some
instances inequities can result. For instance, if a person buys a
building lot within a municipality which is served by a sewage
collection line installed by the developer, the property owner un-
doubtedly pays the cost of constructing this line in the purchase
price of the property. If sewage collection laterals are installed
in other sections of the municipality and the cost is defrayed
from charges derived from the operation of the sewer or water
system or from an ad valorem tax levy, then in either case the
property owner, who had paid for his own sewer lateral lines in
full, would also contribute towards the cost of constructing sew-
age collection laterals serving other properties within the
municipality.
In the year 1898 the South Carolina Supreme Court ruled in
the case of Mauldin v. City Council of Greenville,4 that the gen-
eral assembly could not empower a city to impose assessments
against abutting property owners to defray the costs of paving
sidewalks, in the absence of specific constitutional authorization.
This holding was reaffirmed with regard to assessments for the
installation of water lines in the case of Stehmeyer v. City Coun-
cil of Charleston.5 These decisions undoubtedly have contributed
to the long delay in the enactment of legislation empowering
municipalities to impose front foot assessments for the purpose
of defraying the costs of constructing sewage laterals.
In 1962 in the case of Distin v. Bolding, the South Carolina
Supreme Court upheld the validity of assessments imposed to
defray the costs of constructing sewage facilities. The assess-
ments in the Distin case were actually service charges which
would become liens upon the property served in the event they
were not paid; and furthermore, Distin dealt with a public serv-
ice district and not an incorporated city or town. Consequently,
Distin is not conclusive as to the right of a municipality to im-
pose front foot assessments to defray the costs of constructing
sewer laterals. However, it was a sufficient indication that such
4. 53 S.C. 285, 31 S.E. 252 (1898).
5. 53 S.C. 259, 31 S.E. 322 (1898).
6. 240 S.C. 545, 126 S.E.2d 649 (1962).
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legislation m.ight be upheld that the general assembly at its 1965
session enacted Act No. 3497 which, inter alia, establishes a pro-
cedure by which municipalities may impose front foot assess-
ments against the property abutting sewer lines in order to de-
fray all or a portion of the cost of installing such lines. The act
further confirms the right of a municipality to place into effect,
revise, enforce and collect sewage collection charges and to adopt
regulations requiring all properties to which sewer service is
available to connect to a municipal sewage collection facility.
The act also expressly gives any municipality the power to con-
tract with any public or private agency operating a water system
within the municipality for the collection of such sewer charges,
to regulate generally with respect to the discharge of sewage,
etc., and to make unpaid sewer service charges a lien against the
property served.
Briefly, in connection with the imposition of front foot assess-
ments, the act provides that an ordinance providing for the same
must first be enacted by the municipal council. Thereafter, upon
the completion of the sewer laterals, the municipal council must
then determine how much of the cost of constructing these lat-
erals will be assessed against each property according to the
extent of the respective frontage thereon, by an equal rate per
foot of such frontage, and make out an assessment roll showing
the amount assessed against each property.
A public meeting must then be provided for the hearing of
any objections. Written notice of this meeting must be mailed
to each property owner to be affected. Following the meeting
the assessment roll, either in its original form or as modified,
is confirmed by the municipal council. All objecting property
owners must be given written notice of the assessment finally
confirmed against his property and the right to appeal to the
courts is preserved. A copy of the confirmed assessment is turned
over to the treasurer of the municipality for collection in the
same manner as municipal taxes; and past due assessments are
to be collected by the sheriff or delinquent tax collector of the
municipality. The act further provides for the payment of front
foot assessments in installments, and prescribes that the funds
derived from front foot assessments must be used to defray the
costs, to the extent prescribed by the municipal council, of con-
structing sewage lateral connections or to provide debt service
on bonds issued to defray such costs.
7. S.C. Acts & J. PEs. 1965, p. 614.
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The provisions of the act with regard to notice to property
owners would seem to comply with the requirements of due
process set out in the Distin case. Consequently, the principal
issue yet to be resolved by the court is whether or not the hold-
ings in the Mauldin and Stehmeyer decisions apply to invalidate
the act as far as the right to impose front foot assessments is
concerned, or whether the subsequent holdings affirming the
right of the general assembly to provide for the imposition of
assessments, beginning with the case of Evans v. Beattie,$ and
continuing through Distin, sustain the right of the general
assembly to empower a municipality to impose front foot as-
sessments.
Sewer service charges are most efficiently collected on a water
bill because if charges are not paid when due, water service can
be discontinued until the sewer service charges are paid. How-
ever, in cases where a municipality owned sewer system serves
property not served by (a) a municipal water system, or (b) a
private water system which will enforce the collection of sewer
charges, the only practical method of enforcing the payment of
a sewer bill is by making the unpaid charge a lien against the
property served as in Distin. The act here, following the proce-
dure approved in the Distin decision, provides a method by
which a municipality can make unpaid sewer charges liens
against the property served.
B. Special Purpose Districts Autorized to Impose Front Foot
Assessments for Sewer Lines
Act No. 397 of 1965-Act No. 3979 empowers special purpose
or public service districts exercising the power to construct and
operate the sewage collection and disposal facilities (a) to place
into effect, revise, enforce and collect a schedule of charges for
its sewage collection, (b) to contract with any public or private
agency operating a water system for the collection of such sewer
charges, (c) to adopt and enforce regulations requiring all prop-
erties to which sewer service is available to connect to the dis-
trict's sewage collection facilities as now existing or hereafter
improved, (d) to make regulations generally with respect to the
discharge of sewage and the use of privies, septic tanks and other
types of sewage facilities, (e) to impose front foot assessments
against properties abutting the sewage collection laterals, and
8. 137 S.C. 496, 135 S.E. 538 (1926).
9. S.C. AcTs & J. Rls. 1965, p. 614.
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(f) to make unpaid sewer service charges a lien against the
property served. -
Heretofore by special enactments particular special purpose
districts have been given some of the powers set forth in this
act. However, the act here is of general application and applies
to any special purpose or public service district now existing or
hereafter created by an act of the general assembly now or from
time to time exercising the power to construct and operate sewer
collection, disposal and treatment facilities. The act provides
that the powers conferred thereby shall be exercised in the man-
ner and to the extent set forth therein and that the provisions
of this act shall supercede the analogous provisions of all special
acts which may empower special purpose districts to exercise any
of the powers conferred by this act.
This act empowers special purpose districts to enforce the
collection of sewer charges in one of two ways. Special purpose
districts are empowered to contract with any agency distributing
water throughout the district constituting such agency as an
agent of the district to collect sewer charges and providing, in
the event of non-payment, the water collection agency will dis-
connect water service until the delinquent sewer service charges
are paid. The other method provided is to make the unpaid sewer
service charges a lien against the property served. In the event
the unpaid sewer service charge is made a lien, a notice to that
effect to property owners must be given and a hearing held, inas-
much as this would constitute making an assessment against real
property.10
Perhaps the most far reaching provisions of this act are those
which empower public service districts to impose front foot as-
sessments to defray the costs of constructing sewer lateral collec-
tion lines. In the past, sewer lines have been constructed and
extended by public service districts from the proceeds derived
either from the imposition of assessments in the form of a dis-
trict wide ad valorem tax levy or from revenues derived from
the operation of the sewer system itself. In some instances a
more equitable scheme would include the imposition of front foot
assessments against properties in front of which the sewer lat-
erals are to be constructed. The purpose of such assessments is
to defray all or a portion of the costs of actually laying the
sewer collection lines in front of the properties to be benefitted
therefrom. This act provides the procedure whereby such front
10. Distin v. Bolding, 240 S.C. 545, 126 S.E.2d 649 (1962).
[Vol. 18
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foot assessments can be imposed which includes the giving of
written notice to each property owner affected, and the holding
of a hearing in regard to any objections as to the amount of the
assessment. The procedure provided for the imposition of front
foot assessments and the collection thereof is substantially the
same as the machinery provided in Act No. 34911 in the case
of the imposition of front foot assessments by incorporated
cities and towns.
This act also provides that all monies realized from front foot
assessments shall be used to defray the costs to the extent pro-
vided by the district commission of the establishment and con-
struction of sewage lateral collection lines, or to provide debt
service on bonds issued by the district to defray the costs of
such construction.
Assessments have provided a traditional method of financing
public improvements by a special purpose district in South Caro-
lina for many years. In 1926 the South Carolina Supreme Court
in the case of Evans v. Beattie,12 upheld the right of the general
assembly to create the coastal highway district and empower it
to impose assessments for the benefits conferred against all tax-
able properties within the district in order to provide debt serv-
ice on bonds issued to construct a highway through a portion of
the district. The right of a special purpose district, pursuant to
legislative authority, to impose assessment to defray the cost of
constructing sewer facilities was upheld in Rutledge v. Sewer
District.'3 In the Evans and Rutledge cases the assessments were
actually in the form of district wide ad valorem tax levies. An
assessment is sustained on the theory that it is payment by prop-
erty owners for a benefit conferred upon their respective prop-
erties, and it is not essential that this benefit be measured on
the basis of the assessed value of the taxable property of a par-
ticular taxpayer. In the Distin case the South Carolina Supreme
Court upheld the power of the general assembly to provide for
an assessment which was based on a sewer service charge to be
imposed against properties connected to a sewage facility owned
and operated by a public service district. In the act here the
assessment is computed on another basis, to wit: according to
the extent of the respective frontage of properties thereon by
equal rate per foot of such frontage. This particular basis for
11. S.C. AcTs &J. REs. 1965, p. 614.
12. 137 S.C. 496, 135 S.E. 538 (1926).
13. 139 S.C. 188, 137 S.E. 597 (1927).
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an assessment has never been expressly approved by the South
Carolina Supreme Court although there are dicta in the opinions
in the Evans, Rutledge and Distin decisions approving the im-
position of assessments on the basis of front footage. Consequent-
ly, a test suit has been instituted and is presently pending in the
court of common pleas in Charleston County for the purpose of
having the South Carolina Supreme Court rule on the validity of
the front foot assessments provided by this act.
60. Municipalities and Special Purpose Districts Authorized to
Contract to Provide Sewer Facilities
Act No. 386 of 1965. Sewage collection, treatment and disposal
facilities were originally conceived of as a function of an incor-
porated city or town. In 1943, the South Carolina Supreme
Court in the case of Doran v. Robertson,14 held that the con-
struction of a sewage system was not an ordinary county pur-
pose within the meaning of article X, section 6 of the South
Carolina Constitution, and as a consequence, a county could not
levy taxes or issue bonds to construct a sewer system. As a result,
sewer systems have been constructed outside of the boundaries
of incorporated cities and towns, in many instances, by so called
special purpose districts created by the general assembly for that
purpose and having the power to impose taxes and issue bonds
for that purpose.15
In some areas separately owned public sewer systems have been
constructed in close proximity to each other. Furthermore, it is
apparent that in some instances a joint undertaking by munici-
palities and/or special purpose districts would provide the most
economical and efficient sewage collection, treatment and dis-
posal facilities for an area which lies partly within a munici-
pality and partly within a special purpose district, or partly
within each of two municipalities, or partly within each of two
special purpose districts.
Until the enactment of Act No. 38616 no statutory authoriza-
tion existed by which municipalities and special purpose districts
could contract to undertake a joint enterprise for establishing,
operating, maintaining or extending of sewage collection, treat-
ment and disposal facilities, or any of them. Act No. 386 express-
ly empowers any incorporated municipality or special purpose
14. 203 S.C. 434, 27 S.E.2d 714 (1943).
15. Rutledge v. Sewer Dist., 139 S.C. 188, 137 S.E. 597 (1927).
16. S.C. Acrs & J. REs. 1965, p. 693.
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district to enter into contracts with other incorporated munici-
palities or special purpose districts for the construction and
operation of facilities for the collection, disposal and treatment
of sewage. Furthermore, the act provides that the contracting
parties may enter into agreements with regard to the ownership
of the facility, the apportioning the cost of operating and main-
taining the same and the providing of funds with which to con-
struct the sewage facility.
The contracting parties are empowered to raise funds for
which they may be obligated under the terms of their contract
to defray the costs of operation and maintenance either by an
ad valorem tax levy or through the imposition of a sewer service
charge; the sewer service charge may be collected either by com-
bining it with the water bill, or by making it a lien against the
property served in the event of non payment. The act also pro-
vides that any special purpose district entering into a contract
pursuant thereto obligating it to issue bonds whose proceeds are
to be used for the purpose of constructing or enlarging sewer
facilities shall have in addition to any other authorization, the
right to issue general obligation bonds to fulfill its contractural
obligations under the procedure provided by the County Bond
Act.' 7
D. Advance Refunding of Outstanding Bonds Authorized
Act No. 309 of 1965. The interest which a public body is re-
quired to pay on its obligations, whether general obligation bonds
or bonds payable from a revenue producing facility such as a
water and sewer system, is determined by the conditions existing
in the money market at the time the bonds are sold. These con-
ditions naturally fluctuate from year to year and even from
month to month with the result that the interest costs likewise
fluctuate. Many public entities have outstanding bonds which
were sold during periods when the interest cost was high. In
some instances a public entity can effect considerable savings by
calling in its outstanding bonds prior to maturity and refunding
them by an issue of bonds which would sell at a lower rate of
interest. In a case where the outstanding bonds to be refunded
cannot be prepaid for a number of years, the advantageous
money market can nevertheless be taken advantage of through
the immediate issuance of the refunding bonds whose proceeds
17. S.C. CODE ANx. § 14-511 to -529 (1962).
1966]
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would be held for the payment of the outstanding bonds at such
times as they mature or can be called for prepayment.
In 1940, the town of Hartsville had outstanding four issues
of bonds two of which were redeemable at the option of the town
after December 1, 1940, two of which were redeemable at the
option of the town on November 1, 1941. The interest on these
outstanding bonds was considerably higher than the interest
rate at which the town could sell bonds in 1940. Thus, in July,
of 1940, the town undertook to issue bonds to obtain funds with
which to call the outstanding bonds for payment on December
1, 1940, and November 1, 1941. This action was attacked on
the ground that the new issue was to be made too far in advance
of the maturity of the issue then outstanding, and this amounted
to money market speculation by town officials. The court held
in that instance in its decision in the case of KaZber 'v. Stokes,'8
that the refunding bonds could be issued although all of the
bonds to be retired therefrom would not be redeemable until
seventeen months after the issuance of the refunding bonds.
In 1941 the general assembly enacted the "Refunding Act",
now codified as sections 1-681 to 1-699 of the South Carolina
Code. This statute provides a method by which incorporated
cities or towns, school districts, counties or other political sub-
divisions or divisions of the state can refund outstanding general
obligation bonds, whether or not such general obligation bonds
are additionally secured by pledge of other revenues. This statute
provides that the refunding bonds may not be issued sooner than
one year from the date the outstanding bonds fall due or have
been called for redemption. In the case of bonds payable from
the revenues of any revenue producing project, sections 59-651
to 59-682 of the South Carolina Code provide a means by which
counties, townships, cities and incorporated towns may issue
refunding bonds. This statute does not have a limitation as to
the time when such refunding bonds can be issued in relation to
the time that the outstanding bonds can be redeemed. Conse-
quently, it would appear to permit refunding at any time.
Against this background at its 1965 session, the general as-
sembly enacted Act No. 30919 in order to establish the method
by which advanced refunding may be accomplished by the state
and its agencies, instrumentalities, political subdivisions, and
authorities in cases where the outstanding bonds cannot be re-
18. 194 S.C. 339, 9 S.E.2d 785 (1940).
19. S.C. AcTs & J. Ras. 1965, p. 551.
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deemed until more than six months from the issuance of the
refunding bonds. The only conditions imposed upon an advanced
refunding under this act are (a) that the advanced refunding
take place not more than five years prior to the date on which
the outstanding bonds mature or can be made subject to redemp-
tion in accordance with their tenor and terms, (b) that a saving
be effected through an advanced refunding, and (c) that through
the means of investing the proceeds of any refunding bonds in
investments permitted by the act the effective interest rate
earned thereon shall equal or exceed the interest to be paid upon
the refunding bonds between the time the issuance of the refund-
ing bonds and the redemption of the outstanding bonds.
If these conditions are met, this act permits the State of South
Carolina, its agencies and institutions, counties or incorporated
municipalities, school districts, special purpose districts, authori-
ties and every other agency or political entity of the state now
or hereafter given the power to incur debt in the form of general
obligation bonds, with or without additional security, or bonds
payable solely from any revenue producing project to utilize
the provisions of either sections 1-681 to 1-699, or sections 59-651
to 59-682 of the South Carolina Code to effect a refunding of
any outstanding bonds. Refunding bonds may be issued in the
amount necessary to pay the outstanding bonds including the
redemption premiums and to cover the costs of issuing refunding
bonds. In the case of revenue bonds the refunding bonds may
be issued also to include any amount necessary to meet the cost
of any improvements to the revenue producing project found
necessary which can be accomplished with the moneys provided
by the proceeds of the refunding bonds issued for the purpose
of constructing such improvements.
The act provides that the proceeds from the sale of the refund-
ing bonds must be held in trust by a corporate trustee to be
applied to the payment of the principal, interest and redemption
premium of the outstanding bonds being refunded.
There would not seem to be any doubt as to the right of the
general assembly to provide for refunding as done by this act
in the case of revenue bonds. However, the issuance of general
obligation bonds is conditioned upon compliance with various
requirements of the South Carolina Constitution. In particular,
such bonds must not violate any applicable debt limitation and
furthermore, must be issued for a corporate purpose of the issu-
ing body. At the present time, the Supreme Court of South
1966]
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Carolina, as pointed out hereinabove, has approved the advance
refunding of general obligation bonds only in the case where
the time lapse was not more than seventeen months between the
issuance of the refunding bonds and the redemption of the out-
standing bonds. The right of the general assembly to provide for
the issuance of refunding general obligation bonds up to five
years before the outstanding bonds would be redeemed as per-
mitted by the act must therefore still be tested in court. With this
in mind, the act here at section 10 contains a saving clause which
provides that if it be held "that the application of this act to
the refunding of general obligation bonds is invalid, such hold-
ing shall not disturb the right of governing boards to effect
advanced refunding with bonds payable from the revenues of any
revenue producing project."
E. Constitutional Amendment Proposed Affecting Elections on
Debt Limitation Amendment
Act No. 468 of 1965. Article XVI, section 1 of the South Caro-
lina Constitution prescribes the manner in which the constitution
can be amended. Included in the amendatory procedure is the
submission of the amendment to the qualified electors of the state
at the next general election thereafter for members of the Souith
Carolina House of Representatives. Consequently, any amend-
ment must be voted on throughout the state, although its effect
may be limited only to a single county or a smaller political sub-
division.
This has occurred frequently in the case of the numerous
amendments to the debt limitation established by article X,
section 5, and although the voters in the county or political sub-
division to be affected approved the amendment it would not
become a part of the constitution unless it passed on a state wide
basis.
At its 1965 session, the general assembly enacted this joint reso-
lution20 proposing an amendment to section 1 of article XVI
of the constitution which would apply in the case of amendments
providing for a change in the bonded debt limitation of a county
or any political subdivision of a county. In such a case, the
proposed amendment would be voted on only by the qualified
electors of the county involved rather than on a state wide basis.
Of course, even though an amendment was voted favorably on
20. S.C. AcTs & J. REs. 1965, p. 827.
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by the qualified electors of the county involved, it would never-
theless require subsequent ratification by the general assembly
before it would become a part of the constitution.
F. State Bank Holding Company Act Passed; Penalties Set Out
Act No. 277 of 1965. Act No. 27721 is designated as "The State
Bank Holding Company Act." The act defines a bank holding
company as any company which directly or indirectly owns,
controls or holds with power to vote twenty-five percent or more
of the voting stock of each of two or more banking institutions;
or which controls the election of a majority of the directors of
any two or more banking institutions; or for the benefit of whose
stockholders or members twenty-five percent or more of the vot-
ing stock of each of two or more banking institutions is held by
one or more trustees. The act specifically excludes any corpora-
tion in which the United States or any state, is .a majority stock-
holder, eleemosynary corporations generally, and firms owning
or controlling stock acquired in connection with the underwriting
of securities which is held only until a sale can be effected.
This act makes it unlawful for any action to be taken resulting
in a company becoming a bank holding company, for any bank
holding company to acquire control of more than five percent
of the voting shares of any bank, or own or substantially own
all of the assets of any bank, or to consolidate or merge with
any other bank holding company, unless the consent and ap-
proval of the state board of bank control first be given.
In passing on applications the state board of bank control is
to consider the financial history and condition of the companies
and banks concerned, and the convenience, needs and welfare of
the communities and area concerned. The board also is to con-
sider whether or not the proposed acquisition or merger would
unreasonably affect adequate and sound banking, the public in-
terest and the preservation of competition in the field of banking.
II. CoURT DEcisIONs
A. Myrtle Beach Bond Election Upheld
The Municipal Bond Act, sections 47-831 to 47-860, inclusive,
of the South Carolina Code is the legislative vehicle by which
incorporated cities and towns may issue general obligation bonds.
21. s.c. AcTs & J. REs. 1965, p. 495.
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Among the requirements to be fulfilled is the filing of a petition
signed by a majority of the freeholders as shown by the munici-
pality's tax books requesting an election upon the question of
issuing the bonds. The statute requires that the petition set forth
"the amount of bonds sought to be issued and the purpose or pur-
poses for which the proceeds thereof are to be expended."
2 2
Prior to August 12, 1963, there was filed with the city council
of Myrtle Beach a petition signed by a majority of the free-
holders of the city requesting an election for the purpose of de-
termining whether or not the city shall be empowered to issue
"general obligation bonds in the amount of $500,000 for the pur-
pose of securing funds with which to acquire a site for and fi-
nance the erection of a municipal civic center . . . ." In acting
on this petition the city council concluded that the eight percent
constitutional debt limitation applicable to the city of Myrtle
Beach would prohibit the issuance of the full amount of the
bonds requested. As a result it submitted to the qualified electors
of the city of Myrtle Beach in an election held on September 3,
1963, the question of whether or not the city of Myrtle Beach
should be empowered to issue "not exceeding $500,000 of general
obligation bonds of the City of Myrtle Beach, or such portion
thereof as shall on the occasion or occasions of their issuance
be within the constitutional debt limitation applicable to the
City of Myrtle Beach. .... 123
The election resulted favorably and a test suit was instituted
to determine whether or not the city of Myrtle Beach could pro-
ceed on the basis of the said petition and election with the issu-
ance of less than 500,000 dollars of general obligation bonds. The
plaintiff contended that inasmuch as the petition sought the
issuance of bonds in an amount greater than that permitted by
the constitutional debt limitation, the city council had no power
to proceed to order the election under the Municipal Bond Act
or to present to the electorate the question in the fashion set
forth above.
The Supreme Court of South Carolina in its decision in Ram-
Sey V. CameronU24 upheld the validity of the proposed bond issue
relying on the earlier decision in the case of Watson v. Living-
ston.21 The court concluded that the petition, in requesting the
22. S.C. CODE ANN. § 47-835 (1962).
23. Ramsey v. Cameron, 245 S.C. 189, 192, 139 S.E2d 765, 767 (1965).
24. 245 S.C. 189, 139 S.E.2d 765 (1965).
25. 154 S.C. 257, 151 S.E. 469 (1930).
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issuance of 500,000 dollars of general obligation bonds, actually
sought the issuance of bonds in any amount up to 500,000 dollars,
and that the city council properly submitted the question at the
special election in the manner set out above.
The petition in question also contained the following language:
"I understand these bonds will be retired by levying an addi-
tional 5 mill tax on real property in Myrtle Beach."26 The
Municipal Bond Act, however, provides only for the issuance of
general obligation bonds payable from an ad valorem tax levy
without limit on all taxable property within the municipality,
and the court consequently held this additional language to be
mere surplusage. The opinion noted that any other decision
would make the petition a nullity. The court assumed that "it
was intended that the petition comply with the provisions of
the Constitution and the Municipal Bond Act."27
A strong dissent was filed. The dissenting opinion points out
that the Municipal Bond Act, in section 47-837, provides that
the municipal council shall order an election if it finds as a pre-
requisite thereto three things with respect to the freeholders'
petition, one of which is "that it seeks the issuance of bonds in
an amount not prohibited by any constitutional limitation .... 2 8
Inasmuch as the petition here sought the issuance of bonds "in
the exact amount of $500,000, which amount City Council found
to be prohibited by the constitutional limitation of 8% . . .-29
the dissenting opinion concludes that the city council was conse-
quently without any authority under the Municipal Bond Act
to order the election.
The dissenting opinion also raises the question of whether or
not the necessary signatures of freeholders could have been ob-
tained if the petition had been unambiguous with regard to the
amount of bonds to be issued and the fashion in which they
would be retired.
B. Sidewalk Assumed to Be Reasonably Safe
The right of a person to recover for injuries or damages to
his personal property through a defect in any street under the
control and within the limits of any city or town is conditioned
26. Ramsey v. Cameron, 295 S.C. 189, 192, 139 S.E.2d 765, 766 (1965).
27. Id. at 197, 139 S.E2d at 769.
28. Id. at 199, 139 S.E2d at 770 (Bussey, J., dissenting).
29. Ibid.
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upon lack of negligence on the part of such person in bringing
about the injury or contributing thereto.30 In the case of Kelly v.
City of Aiken,"' the plaintiff brought a suit for injuries alleged-
ly sustained as a result of tripping on a depression in a sidewalk
in the city of Aiken.
This opinion supports the proposition that a pedestrian is
entitled to assume that a sidewalk is in reasonably safe condition
for such use. However, the opinion'makes it clear that this as-
sumption does not relieve a pedestrian from his duty to exercise
due care, and the question of whether or not such due care was
exercised must be determined from the facts of each case.
30. S.C. CODE AxN. § 47-70 (1962).
31. 245 S.C. 503, 141 S.E.2d 651 (1965).
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